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The increase in the supply of relatively high-skilled workers since
the 1960's, recently accompanied by rapid technical change as a
result of the introduction of new ICT’s, has increased the
demand for high-skilled labour dramatically. In many countries
this has led to a dramatic increase in the skilled workers wage
premium. However, in the Netherlands wage dispersion is hardly
observed. This paper shows why wages have been relatively
stable in the Netherlands. Empirical analysis of a unique data set
reveals that the increase in the demand for skills has been
captured by a more efficient assignment of workers to jobs, not
by increasing wage premiums.
Keywords: wage level and structure, income distribution
JEL classification: J31, O15 See Sanders and Ter Weel (1999) and Chennells and Van Reenen (2000) for overviews of more
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than 100 studies dealing with the phenomenon of SBTC.
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1. Introduction
Douglas (1926) and Tinbergen (1975) have identified the evolution of the wage
structure or the distribution of wages as a race between technical development and
access to education. These observations have gained renewed attention over the last
few years in the debate and literature on skill-biased technical change (SBTC).
According to this strand of literature, new technologies are by their nature
complementary to skills. This suggests that there has always been some SBTC, as a
result of capital-skill complementarity (Griliches, 1969 and Goldin and Katz, 1998),
but the rapid introduction of new technologies, such as computers and Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT’s), has recently led to an acceleration in
SBTC. In this regard, Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) find for the United States that
in the 1970's college graduates earned 55 percent more than high school graduates.
The premium fell to 41 percent in 1980, but then increased to 62 percent in 1995; and
Machin and Van Reenen (1998) present international evidence in favour of the SBTC
hypothesis for the period 1975-89.
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However, as Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) point out, the increased
wage differentials S particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States S have
been well-documented but there is no consensus as to its causes. They argue that part
of the widening of the educational differential can be attributed to a slowdown in the
rate of growth of the skilled population accompanied by continued growth in the
demand for skilled labour, but the source of this growth in demand remains
unexplained.
To improve the understanding of SBTC Acemoglu (1998) argues that new
technologies are not complementary to skills by nature but by design. In his approach
he establishes that when the direction of technical change is endogenous, it can be
shown that the demand for skills and its wage premium first falls and then increases Many studies deal solely with the United States. On the one hand, this is due to the widely
2
availability of data, like the Current Population Survey and other large panel data sets. On the other
hand, the effects of SBTC with respect to the structure of wages seem to be most dramatic in the
United States (and the United Kingdom). There have been big burgeons in wage inequality in the
United States (and in the United Kingdom), while it is argued that other countries S notably
continental European countries S have had a more stable wage structure, mainly as a result of
stickiness in the labour market, like unions and other institutions (e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman,
1991). In these countries the effects of technical change went through rising unemployment levels
(mostly) among unskilled workers: Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1999) conclude in an analysis of
Canada, France and the United States that relative wages for unskilled workers have fallen most in
the United States, while unemployment levels went up most in France and to a lesser extent in
Canada. Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1995) find that the more severe increases in the skill
differential in the United Kingdom and the United States in comparison with Japan can be attributed
to an acceleration in the rate of growth of the demand for more skilled workers. Evidence for France
suggests that the high minimum wage and the ability of French unions to extend contracts in te face
of declining membership has somewhat offset the changes in wages in favour of the skilled workers.
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sharply, following the large increase in the supply of skills, which is in line with the
obsevations of Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) for the United States.
Motivated by this reasoning, this paper develops similar arguments in an
analysis of the evolution of wages in the Netherlands over the past two decades.
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Gottschalk (1997) observes that in the Netherlands the supply of skilled labour has
increased since the 1960's, but the returns to education have declined strongly and are
only recovering gradually, whereas attainment and investment levels among workers
have remained high. While some caution with this observation is appropriate
(Gottschalk does not control for a fall in the legal minimum wage level) he finds that
“the relatively small increase in (wage) inequality in the Netherlands reflects a decline
in the college (skill) premium, which largely offsets the substantial increase between
experience groups and the increase in inequality within groups.”
The impact of an increase in the supply of skilled workers on the wage
premium is determined by two competing forces. First, it is determined by an ordinary
substitution effect, which makes the economy move along a downward sloping
relative demand curve. Second, a (endogenous) technology effect shifts the relative
demand curve for skilled labour, because the increase in the supply of skilled workers
induces faster upgrading of skill-complementary technologies. In Figure 1 the increase
in the supply of skilled labour first moves the economy along a short-run (constant Another argument for relatively stable wages since the late 1960's is given by Van der Wiel (1999).
3
He finds that Dutch wage formation is dominated by wage leading sectors. The wages in these
sectors mainly depend on macroeconomic developments instead of sectoral-specific conditions,
especially in the event of an economic upturn. These findings are also valid after 1982, a period with
more decentralised wage formation. In addition, Dutch inter-industry wage differentials appear to be
noticeably small compared to other (OECD) countries.
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technology) relative demand curve from point A to point B, reducing the skill
premium. Then, as Acemoglu (1998) also argues, this relative supply change increases
the size of the market for technologies complementary to skills, and induces changes
in the direction of technical change towards the availability or abundance of skilled
workers, which shifts the relative demand curve in Figure 1 to point C.
The mechanism underlying Figure 1 is simple. Suppose first that the
substitution effect dominates the technology effect. As a result, the skill premium
falls. This is a plausible result because an increase in the supply of skilled workers
cannot be immediately matched by an equivalent increase in jobs for such workers.
Hence, skilled workers will first be matched to jobs below their skill level. Such
observations, of increased education without increasing wages, may indicate
overinvestment in education and skills in the Netherlands.  Freeman (1976) and
3
Rumberger (1981) examined this issue thoroughly in the United States for the 1960's
and Sicherman (1991) for the 1980's. They describe falling (net) returns to investment
in human capital and conclude that overeducation has led to crowding out of skills,
which is in line with the observations of Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) for the
1980's. For the Netherlands such findings are supported by numerous studies on the
recently relatively low returns to education (e.g. Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988 and
Hartog, 1999 for an overview).
Now if the technical change effect is strong enough, the skill premium will
eventually rise. This is the ABC-case drawn in Figure 1 and offers an explanation for
the changes in the college premium in the United States over the past 3 decades (e.g.
Katz and Murphy, 1992, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993 and Acemoglu, 1999).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 OVER HERE] Lloyd-Ellis (1999) finds that in the period 1970-90 students who went to university in the United
4
States saw a decline in the growth rate of academic achievement at all years of schooling, which
started to become a serious problem by the mid-1970's; from the 1990's on academic achievement
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However, empirical evidence suggests that the increase in the supply of skilled
workers has not led to an increase in the skilled workers wage premium in the
Netherlands as observed in the United States. In terms of Figure 1 it could be argued
that the technology effect does not dominate to the extent it does in the United States
(ABC versus AB’C’). Hence, the premium for skilled labour has not increased as
dramatic as in the United States. Several explanations for this observation can be
given.
First, it has been argued that although technology can account for a significant
part of rising wage dispersion, other factors play a role too. Allen (1996),
investigating the United States, and Machin and Van Reenen (1998), in an empirical
investigation of seven OECD countries, suggest that technical change alone can only
account for a third or less of the changes in wage shares. Hence, the long-run relative
demand for skilled labour in Figure 1 is less steep when the shift in relative demand
for skilled labour due to technical change is increasing to a lesser extent. As a result,
the long-run skill premium may not be at a point such as point C in Figure 1, but at a
lower point like point C’.
Second, labour supply changes, which distribution has changed continuously
as a result of the increase in educational attainment, may affect the structure of the
wage distribution differently in the Netherlands. The relatively high returns to
education in the United States compared to the Netherlands may reflect some relative
supply problem in the United States which leads to wage dispersion. Such an
argument has been made by Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998) in a comparative
study of Canada and the United States. They find that in the 1980's governmental
post-secondary educational programmes in Canada have resulted in only a modest
wage differential relative to the United States, where such programmes were not
implemented. These findings suggest that demand and supply have been better
matched in Canada than in the United States.  A larger increase in the supply of
4goes up again. Indeed, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) present evidence of SBTC in the period
1973-1989. Recent evidence brought together by Murphy and Welch (1999) reveals that since the
mid-1990's the growth of the wage premium for skilled workers slowed down, which is in line with
the observations of Lloyd-Ellis.
 Kiley (1999) considers an alternative approach to get an understanding of SBTC. He builds an
5
expanding varieties framework and shows that an increase in the supply of skilled labour creates
SBTC and increases inequality. Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante (1997) consider a model of
capital-skill complementarity and argue that SBTC simply reflects the rapid growth of the stock of
capital combined with the different ways that equipment interacts with skilled and unskilled labour
in the production technology. However, they do not address the question whether this is due to the
increase in the supply of skilled labour or an (exogenous) increase in the capital stock.
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skilled workers reduces the skilled wage premium in the short run more than is drawn
in Figure 1. If the skill premium is below point B, say at point B’, in Figure 1, it is of
course more difficult or it takes longer to reach a skill premium as high as point C.
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To examine the above empirically, I analyse the Dutch economy along the
lines of the OSA database. This database consists of a representative number of
workers from 13 sectors over the period 1986-98. I try to structure the labour market
and take into account labour demand and supply changes simultaneously. Considering
demand and supply changes simultaneously results in a market equilibrium which can
be identified by a continuously changing mapping of skills assigned to jobs and
consequently to a continuously changing wage rate. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some
preliminary results are discussed. Section 3 presents the estimation results. Section 4
concludes. Other related studies are performed by Hartog and Oosterbeek (1988), Oosterbeek (1990) and
6
Hartog, Oosterbeek and Teulings (1993). The latter examines also the effects of aging on wages in
the Netherlands.
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2. Data and Some Facts and Figures
The data I utilise in this paper are drawn from seven surveys conducted by the
Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek (OSA) from 1986 to 1998
among a relatively small number of individuals. For the seven biannual years
respectively 2,325 (1986), 2,279 (1988), 2,352 (1990), 2,399 (1992), 2,531 (1994),
2,654 (1996) and 2,896 (1998) usable observations are available (total number of
usable observations: 17,436). Participating individuals were asked several dozens of
questions on their labour market position to sketch a clear picture of the Dutch labour
market. The analysis here uses only information from a limited number of questions
on both demand and supply side characteristics.
I have only included employees and have left self-employed individuals aside
because of the unreliable and erratic information for the relevant variables. The same
argument holds for the below 2  and above 98  percentile of the wage distribution.
nd th
Other comparable studies documenting the Dutch labour market in this
respect are rather scarce, mainly due to data limitations. Draper and Manders (1997)
S using a data set which contains educational levels for the period 1969-93 S have
shown that labour-saving technical change explains most of the change in the wage
structure. Less recent studies, which have reached similar conclusions, are performed
by Broer and Jansen (1989) and Hebbink (1991). Broer and Jansen divided the labour
force into three categories and focussed on employment, education and productivity
and found that higher levels of education have a significant influence on productivity
growth in the 1970's and 1980's. Hebbink has also considered three types of labour
and found that skilled labour and capital are complements, but that employment of
unskilled labour has been worsened by a reduction in the price of capital.
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To get an understanding of the data, consider first Figure 2. Figure 2 graphs
the median, 10  and 90  percentile of the real log hourly wage distribution of the data
th th-7-
set for 1986-98. For ease of comparison the figures are indexed to 100 in 1986 for all
three series. The overall picture from this figure is that log hourly wages have steadily
risen over the whole period. I do not observe, like in the United Kingdom and United
States, an acceleration of log hourly earnings in the 1980's and 1990's of the above
median wage workers. The median wage series show an almost 15 percent increase in
wages for the median worker during the period 1986-98. The pattern of this series is
quite linear and shows a steadily increase in the log hourly wage. For the 90
th
percentile of the wage distribution, the log hourly wage rose relatively fast until 1992
(more than 11 percent), while after 1992 the wage increase was far more modest. The
increase in the wage series of the 90  percentile worker is, over the sample period as
th
a whole, comparable to the wage increase of the median worker. As is clear from the
figure, the story is significantly different for the 10  percentile of the wage
th
distribution. Since the partially abandoning of the legal minimum wage in the early
1990's, the wages at the bottom part of the labour market have increased only slightly.
The wage of the 10  percentile worker only went up by some 4 percent in the period
th
1990-98, whereas wages of the median and 90  percentile worker went up 11 by 7
th
and percent, respectively.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 OVER HERE]
I communicate the evolution of the log hourly wage for the degree of wage
inequality in Figure 3. Wage inequality is simply measured by the log hourly wage
differential between the highest ten percent and the lowest ten percent of the wage
distribution and the deviation from the median earners: 90  - 10 , 90  - 50   and 50
th th th th th
- 10 . The degree of wage inequality between the 90  and 10  percentile of the wage
th th th
distribution is increasing rapidly in 1988 and 1990 to some 30 percent. Thereafter, the
wage gap remains relatively stable, which may exhibit the effects of the consensus
policies between labour unions and employer’s organizations. This consensus resulted
in wage moderation and better conditions for the median skilled and hence in some
narrowing wage distribution since the late 1980's. Indeed, the difference between the-8-
90  and 50  percentile is first increasing rapidly but in the 1990's the wage differential
th th
is falling. The overall increase in wage inequality between these two groups is slightly
above 16 percent. The difference between the 50  and the 10  percentile increased by
th th
more than 50 percent from 1986-98.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 OVER HERE]
Regardless of the valuable information Figure 2 and 3 contain, the overall
picture might be sketched too simple, for the figures do not distinguish personal
characteristics, job effects and sector specific properties, i.e. demand and supply
characteristics. In the next section the data are explored to show what the underlying
phenomena to the wage structure are by focussing on both the demand and supply
side of the labour market. Some caution is required here because investigating the cross effect of the variable male and
7
married a positive coefficient is obtained, whereas a negative coefficient turns up when females are
married.
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3. Wages in the Netherlands
Table 1 summarizes some important results for each biannual year between 1986 and
1998. Panel A, B and C report the results of simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions on log hourly wages. In the first panel only labour supply characteristics
are taken into account; Panel B measures only labour demand characteristics and
Panel C includes only sector specific characteristics. The supply side characteristics
are personal characteristics like level of education, age, race, sex and marital status.
Demand side characteristics include job characteristics like job level, firm size and
leadership. The variable in Panel C investigates whether some sectors pay higher
wages than others.
The most important results concerning personal characteristics are that age
has its usual positive effect on log hourly wages, which is likely to be the result of the
presence of seniority payment schemes and the fact that, in general, workers who are
most experienced occupy the highest paid jobs. However, the wage premium resulting
from such schemes is subject to diminishing returns since the age /100 coefficient is
2
negative and significant. The final row of Panel A shows that each year of additional
education yields a return between 4 and 6 percent (except for 1986: 2.9%). The level
of education is measured in five categories each containing some standard years of
education: 12 for the lowest level (i.e. 8 years of primary education and 4 years of
secondary education) and 22 for the highest level of education; the intermediate levels
contain 16, 18 and 20 years of education, respectively. Discrimination on race does
not seem to be present significantly. Discrimination with respect to sex seems to be
severe (between 6.9 and 17.3 percent), but when controlling for the jobs women
occupy (mainly low-skilled jobs) discrimination on sex is less severe. Finally, if an
employee is married a wage premium between .4 and 6.4 percent is obtained.  The
7
level of significance of the regressions is measured by the adjusted R  statistic. This
2 The regression in Panel A of Table 1 could alternatively be run at once with dummies for six of the
8
seven biannual years (one reference year). This is sometimes preferred because as a result of
technical progress (and inflation) the intercept might change or shift over time. When 1986 is taken
as the year of reference the coefficients (and their standard errors) do not change dramatically:
Intercept (.023 (.051)), Age (.068 (.002)), Age /100 (-.001 (.000)), Non-Dutch (.007 (.003)), Female
2
(-.159 (.008)) and Married (.032 (.009)). The year dummies are for 1988 (.140 (.017)), 1990 (.286
(.017)), 1992 (.352 (.018)), 1994 (.328 (.018)), 1996 (.397 (.017)) and 1998 (.447 (.017)). The
reason why I choose for the analysis as shown in Table 1 is that I explore and use the coefficients of
each biannual year in the analysis of Table 2. 
 The 1994 CBS SBI code is used for all years. Although other CBS SBI codes are available for years
9
before 1994 I analyse the data with only this SBI code. This is mainly done to obtain consistent
comparisons of job levels for all years. A disadvantage may be on the one hand that some jobs have
disappeared in the period 1986-94, while on the other hand new jobs have been created since 1994.
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statistic lies for Panel A between .279 (1992) and .499 (1994) which are frequently
found values for cross-sectional regressions, particularly when it is noted that only
supply side characteristics are taken into account in Panel A.
8
 The demand side of the labour market is taken into account by distinguishing
5 different job levels (elementary, low, medium, high and scientific) which are divided
in white-collar and blue-collar jobs (except for elementary jobs). These demand side
or job characteristics are aggregated from more than a 1,000 four-digit occupational
titles into these 9 categories, according to the 1994 CBS SBI code scheme, which
categorises mainly on the basis of an analysis of the type of work done in a particular
job.  Panel B in Table 1 shows that, relative to a low-level blue-collar job, the
9
expected pattern of increasing wages along with increasing job levels is present in all
years. However, when the same job level is taken into account for each single year it
can be observed that the wage premium of the high and scientific jobs, relative to a
low-skilled blue-collar job, drops since the early 1990's. This is in line with the
pictures drawn in Figure 2 and 3, where the wage gap between the high-paid and the
others is falling; or is at least not rising. The fact that high-level and scientific blue-
collar jobs pay a higher wage than comparable white-collar jobs may be the result of a
relative decline in the enrollment rate and subsequent scarcity of workers with
technical studies. Oosterbeek and Webbink (1997) find that the market share of
science and engineering in university education decreased from 35% in 1960 to 22%
in 1989. This decline in relative high-level blue-collar supply may have led the wage-11-
premium above the average high-level worker wage premium in Panel B.
It is also tested whether firm size has an impact on log hourly wages. It turns
out that larger firms pay higher wages ranging from 1.6 percent in 1988 to 4.1
percent in 1996. The overall picture suggests that over time this effect is increasing.
Finally, a proxy of the managerial skills of employees has been made by investigating
the wage premium with regard to the number of workers a particular person
supervises. The data are divided into six classes: supervising none, 1 to 4 persons, 5
to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 49 and over 50. It turns out that a more or less constant wage
premium of about 6 to 7 percent exists when a worker is supervising other workers.
The explanatory power of the regressions in Panel B is less than in Panel A.
The adjusted R  is lowest in 1990 (.213) and highest in 1996 (.363).
2
The effects of sector characteristics on log hourly wages in Panel C of Table 1
deliver results that are at first sight not very robust. This is of course due to
unobserved heterogeneity between an unknown distribution of workers within these
sectors. However, relative to the transport sector, workers in some sectors obtain
significantly lower or higher wages throughout the whole sample period.
[INSERT TABLE 1 OVER HERE]
The information from Table 1 can be used to describe the interaction of labour
demand and supply. What is of interest are the wage effects of the high  relative
supply of skilled workers. In terms of Figure 1, this is the move from point B, the
short-run labour market reaction to an increase in the supply of relatively skilled
labour, to some new long-run labour market situation, point C. When examining the
shift from B to C, information on the skill premium and the extent of the shift in skills
supply is obtained.
To do so, Teulings (1995) and Teulings and Vieira (1999) have developed an The analysis and econometric application of Teulings (1995) and Teulings and Vieira (1999) is far
10
more complex. Teulings (1998) examines such an analysis in detail. Here a simple strategy is
applied. However, the conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis here are not significantly
different from the results obtained in the above mentioned studies. Gautier (2000) also considers the
assignment of workers to jobs. He investigates the consequences for both skilled and unskilled
employment rates when unemployed skilled workers search for both simple and complex jobs and
continue search for complex jobs when they are assigned to a simple job first. Van den Berg, Gautier,
Van Ours and Ridder (1999) investigate whether cyclical crowding out is present in the Netherlands.
Taking into account job complexity it turns out that workers with more years of education ar not
more productive than their less educated colleagues. They find evidence that workers with relatively
many years of schooling select themselves into high wage firms, which is in line with the view of job
competition and screening among employers.
 There is some evidence on France (Entorf and Kramarz, 1997, Goux and Maurin, 1997 and
11
Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz, 1999) and Germany (DiNardo and Pischke, 1997 and Kaiser, 1998).
Groot and De Grip (1991) consider changing demand for skills in the Dutch banking sector. In a
book edited by Freeman and Katz (1995) and an OECD (1996) study evidence on some other
countries is discussed as well.
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empirical strategy as to how assign workers to jobs.  In terms of Figure 1, this means
10
that immediately after the shift in relative labour supply, skilled workers are assigned
to jobs that require actually less skills (point B). In this state of affairs, skilled workers
are overeducated to perform such a job and their capabilities are not fully utilised.
This situation seems to be applicable particularly to the Netherlands for a long time
now. Many, mainly Dutch, studies have addressed the phenomenon of overeducation
and have given many reasons for it. These reasons are e.g. the relatively low burden
to enter higher education, job competition and strong screening by employers, which
induces investment in skills above the equilibrium levels demanded (e.g. Brunello and
Medio, 1996). However, recent technical change, like the introduction of new ICT’s,
acts as a competing force and has shifted labour demand towards the skilled. This
shift in favour of skilled labour increases the price of skilled labour and hence may
result in a wage premium for skilled workers. This line of reasoning has been
developed by scholars such as Krueger (1993), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) and
Katz (1999) for the United States. Evidence for the United Kingdom has been
brought together by Machin (1996), Green (1999), Haskel and Heden (1999) and
Riley and Young (1999). Evidence on other countries is less-developed up to this
point in time.  This might be due to the fact that the premium for skilled labour did
11-13-
not increase to the extent it did in the United States, as is already clear from Figure 2
and 3.
To investigate the Dutch situation Teulings (1995) introduces the concept of
job complexity, which is to a certain extent similar to Rosen’s (1974) model where
heterogenous and utility maximizing workers choose the optimal amount of job
complexity.
Such complexity can be measured by the degree of heterogeneity among jobs
and the extent of substitution between different worker levels. The heterogeneity is
determined by the tasks and skills required to perform such a job. For example, a
secretary might have some similar skills as a manager but the extent of substitution
might be very limited because the secretary misses some essential high-level skills to
be a manager. However, a manager is often fully able to perform the tasks of a
secretary. On the other hand, the extent of substitution between a secretary and a
clerk might be very high because their skills are not so different. Consequently, the
lower the level of job complexity the more substitution between workers is possible. 
Job complexity also plays a role in the distinction between worker types (e.g.
blue versus white-collar workers). Gould (1997) argues in this respect that the skills
that determine a worker’s ability as a doctor are very different from those that are
used as a factory worker. As a consequence, those who are good at being a doctor
may not be very productive factory workers and vice versa. Substituting a professor
of chemistry with a professor of economics may turn out to be a disaster. Hence, the
extent of substitution between different types of workers is very limited. This limited
substitution leads to distinct ‘occupational cells’, and explains a part of the current
boom in wages of some occupations such as software programmers and other ICT-
related workers.
To analyse labour demand and supply empirically consider the predicted
values of the regression in Panel A of Table 1 as a measure of a worker’s skill. This is
a plausible assumption, since the set of personal characteristics is a reflection of a
worker’s capabilities standard to the literature. Similarly, consider the linear
combination of job characteristics in Panel B of Table 1 as a measure of the)P ’ j
i
)Si ¯ Pi % j
i
)Pi ¯ Si,
 Machin and Van Reenen (1998) define the aggregate change in the skilled proportion over a given
12
time period )P as
where P  is the proportion of skilled workers in industry i and S is the share of total employment in i i
industry i. A bar over a variable denotes a time mean. The first term on the right-hand side is the
change in the aggregate proportion of skilled workers attributable to shifts ‘between’ industries with
different proportions of skilled workers. The second term in the expression is the change attributable
to changes in the proportion of skilled workers ‘within’ industries.
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complexity of the job. This is in line with the extent of substitution between job levels
and types discussed above. The predicted values in Panel C of Table 1 can be viewed
as a measure of ‘within’ or ‘between’ sector changes in the assignment of workers to
jobs, i.e. ‘upgrading’  (e.g. Berman, Bound and Machin, 1998 and Haskel and
Slaughter, 1998). In this regard, within changes are defined as changes in the wage-
bill share of particular workers within a sector. Between changes reflect the fact
whether a change in the composition of the workforce is similar between different
sectors in the economy.
12
Panel A of Table 2 first shows the correlation between the measure of skill
and complexity. The correlation coefficients are at first rather low but steadily
increasing over time. This suggests that over time higher skilled workers have been
assigned to more complex jobs and that this is increasing over the sample period. This
is an interesting observation because it suggests that over time the assignment of
workers to jobs has become more efficient. This more efficient assignment of workers
to jobs might be the result of technical change which is in line with the move from
point B to C in Figure 1.
Panel A also contains the same information on the correlation of a worker’s
skill and the sector of employment. This second correlation shows a relation between
skills and upgrading. This measure is clearly not as strong as the first correlation
because the causal relation between skill and sector might be subject to many other
effects. However, the correlation coefficients do point towards increasing between
sector ‘upgrading’ (higher correlation coefficients), which induces higher log hourly-15-
wages. This suggests that although sectors are not moving similarly from point B to C
in Figure 1, they are moving more in line with each other in 1998 than in 1986.
Finally, Panel A analyses the correlation of the predicted values of job
complexity and sector upgrading. This steadily rising correlation coefficient gives
insight as to which sectors pay a higher wage to similar jobs relative to other sectors.
The correlation coefficient is rather low suggesting that jobs of similar complexity in
different sectors are not valued similarly. This is in line with the findings of Berman,
Bound and Machin (1998) for several OECD countries that the bulk of the change in
the prices for skills is going on within, rather than between, sectors. This leads to
different valuations for similar job complexity levels between sectors, and underlines
the fact that workers are “trapped” in a particular occupational cell as argued above.
In Panel B, the values of all three measures for 1986-98 are reconsidered,
weighing personal, job and sector characteristics with their coefficients for 1986. In
this manner, it is possible to compare the values of the skill and job complexity and
sector upgrading for all seven years. From Panel B it can be observed that, comparing
1986 with 1998, the mean of the skill measure rose by 16.4 percent (from 2.244 to
2.408), the mean of the measure of job complexity rose, in a comparable manner, by
16.6 percent (from 2.293 to 2.459) and the mean of the measure of sector upgrading
rose by only 10.3 percent (from 2.331 to 2.434). 
The first two observations indicate that the increase in the average level of job
complexity as a result of increasing skills demand is captured by the rise in the supply
of skilled workers. However, the complexity of the sectoral component is not
catching up with the rise in both demand and supply. These results give an
explanation why wages have not gone up dramatically in the Netherlands. If the
increased demand for skills as a result of technical change has been captured by the
(over)supply of skills there is no need for employers to pay wages above the initial
level in Figure 1. The reason for this almost perfect adjustment might reflect a more
efficient assignment of workers to jobs since 1980's. This is also supported by the
results from Panel A, which indicate a more efficient assignment of workers to jobs
over the period 1986-98. However, these results run counter to the results of studies
that predict an increase in overeducation in the 1990's in the Netherlands. If-16-
overeducation would have increased the increase in the coefficient of skill would have
increased more than the measure of job complexity.
Finally, in Panel C of Table 2, the measures from Panel B of job complexity
and sector upgrading are regressed on the measures of skill. First, this is done
separately. It can be observed that the effect of an additional unit of skill on the
expected complexity of the job is significantly higher in 1998 than in 1986. The results
with regard to sector upgrading point into the same direction but are less severe. In
general the coefficient remains constant with some peaks in 1988 and 1994. Second,
combining both job complexity and sector upgrading it is possible to explain most of
the effects of an additional unit of skill on the expected overall complexity. Again the
coefficient is rising over time. 
In terms of the predictions of the model by Teulings (1995) this yields - when
the job complexity is a function of skill - that the distribution of the skill function in
terms of complexity has narrowed, which runs counter to the empirical results
obtained by Teulings. He finds that the effects of an additional unit of skill on the
expected complexity of the job a worker performs is less in 1988 than in 1982. The
main reason given for this was that “the large supply of highly skilled workers makes
it less likely that they will obtain highly complex jobs in 1988 than was previously the
case” (p. 285).  This suggests that the findings by Teulings (1995) and many other for
the Netherlands for the 1980's do not apply to the 1990's and that technical change
has indeed increased job complexity throughout the 1990's, thereby increasing the
returns to education and assigning workers more efficiently.
These observations point towards a move from point B tot point C in Figure 1
because the effect of an additional unit of skill and sector upgrading on the expected
complexity of the job is significantly higher in 1998 than in 1986. This indicates that
following the large increase in supply of skilled workers, demand is adjusting and
hence the returns to skill are increasing. This is exactly what is captured by the move
from the short-run to the long-run equilibrium in Figure 1.
[INSERT TABLE 2 OVER HERE]-17-
4. Concluding Remarks
This approach has offered a link between the return to skill and the assignment of
workers to jobs, which yielded predictions for the return to skill, the allocation of
workers to jobs, and te distribution of wages. The paper also offered an explanation
of the relative stable wage structure in the Netherlands in the period 1986-98 despite
the labour market changes following the introduction of new ICT’s in this period.
Although the data set is relatively small, the results are statistically strong and
significant.
Many studies have established that the introduction of new ICT’s has led to a
change in the wage structure in favour of high-skilled workers. It is argued that these
workers adjust relatively easily and rapidly to the changing work environment. Katz
(1999) argues that many labour market analysts have tried to draw a causal
connection between rising wage inequality and increases in the growth rate of the
relative demand for high-skilled workers driven by technical changes associated with
the computer revolution (e.g. Krueger, 1993 and Haskel and Heden, 1999). However,
as Freeman and Katz (1995) argue labour demand factors do not explain much of the
differential growth of wage inequality or educational earnings differentials. 
In contrast, differential growth in the supply of workers by level of education
has contributed to the greater rise in educational wage differentials. Most studies
imply that improvements in access to post-secondary education and appropriate skills
training may be necessary to allow the wage benefits of the new technologies
associated with the digital economy to be more widely shared. Murphy, Riddell and
Romer (1998) argue that this is particularly true for the United States. Katz and
Freeman (1995) add to this that countries with at least modest increases in skill
differentials by the end of the 1980's (besides the United Kingdom and the United
States also Australia and Japan) experienced some decline in the rate of growth of the
supply of skilled workers. Other countries, like the Netherlands, have already
established relatively good access to post-secondary education and faced a larger
increase in the supply of skilled labour than in the United States. -18-
Indeed, many studies reveal that in the Netherlands high and persistent levels
of overeducation were present from the 1960's onwards. These levels of
overeducation may have resulted in a relatively stable wage structure. In terms of
Figure 1, the United States might have faced a move from point B to C, while the
Netherlands are facing a move from point B’ to C’.
This paper has provided evidence in favour of this latter effect. In an empirical
manner, wages in the Netherlands are analysed. The results from this exercise are that
over time higher skilled workers have been assigned to more complex jobs and that
this is increasing over the sample period. This observation suggests that the
assignment of workers to jobs has become more efficient which indicates a better
“utilisation” of workers. This result is reinforced by the increase in the average level
of complexity of labour demand which is similar to the rise in the level of skill among
workers. 
Together these results provide an explanation why wages have been relatively
stable in the Netherlands: the increase in the demand for skills as a result of technical
change has been captured by a more efficient assignment of workers to jobs and not
by dramatically increasing wages.
In the end, the early observations of Douglas (1926) and Tinbergen (1975)
seem to be applicable to the current labour market developments. As a result of good
access to education, the Netherlands have absorbed the recent increase in demand for
skilled labour relatively easy.-19-
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TABLE 1 S REGRESSION OF LOG HOURLY WAGES ON PERSONAL, JOB AND SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS
Total sample 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
(N = 17,436) (N = 2,325) (N = 2,279) (N = 2,352) (N = 2,399) (N = 2,531) (N = 2,654) (N = 2,896)
A. Personal Characteristics Only
Intercept .426 (.048) .355 (.158) .022 (.133) .383 (.131) .806 (.129) .463 (.101) .432 (.092) .603 (.099)
Age .069 (.002) .068 (.008) .075 (.007) .075 (.007) .052 (.007) .058 (.005) .070 (.005) .059 (.005)
Age /100 -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000) -.001 (.000)
2
Non-Dutch -.008 (.020) -.062 (.053) -.083 (.049) .057 (.055) .055 (.053) .089 (.062) .037 (.036) -.006 (.038)
Female -.069 (.008) .. .. -.142 (.021) -.159 (.020) -.165 (.014) -.173 (.014) -.172 (.014)
Married .023 (.009) .041 (.027) .009 (.026) .004 (.026) .042 (.025) .064 (.018) .062 (.017) .048 (.017)
Level of education .042 (.001) .029 (.004) .051 (.004) .040 (.004) .046 (.004) .056 (.003) .047 (.003) .053 (.003)
R  adjusted .325 .371 .319 .295 .279 .499 .452 .426
2
B. Job Characteristics Only
Intercept 2.367 (.011) 2.133 (.020) 2.237 (.033) 2.334 (.032) 2.427 (.029) 2.423 (.025) 2.473 (.023) 2.574 (.025)
Job (reference: low blue-collar):
0 (elementary) .080 (.013) .078 (.035) .077 (.031) .069 (.038) .056 (.039) -.089 (.033) -.110 (.032) -.096 (.035)
1 (low white-collar) .054 (.013) .102 (.027) .091 (.045) .018 (.041) -.025 (.038) .003 (0.27) -.096 (.026) -.062 (.028)
2 (medium blue-collar) .168 (.011) .174 (.021) .164 (.037) .174 (.033) .174 (.031) .101 (.026) .054 (.025) .081 (.026)
2 (medium white-collar) .174 (.011) .211 (.023) .145 (.036) .127 (.034) .105 (.031) .132 (.025) .073 (.023) .086 (.025)
3 (high blue-collar) .445 (.014) .497 (.029) .468 (.042) .377 (.041) .425 (.037) .442 (.031) .304 (.029) .306 (.029)
3 (high white-collar) .396 (.014) .387 (.033) .385 (.047) .377 (.042) .299 (.038) .322 (.033) .307 (.029) .283 (.030)
4 (scientific blue-collar) .501 (.025) .469 (.051) .475 (.077) .414 (.076) .476 (.073) .573 (.052) .400 (.048) .401 (.052)
4 (scientific white-collar) .553 (.022) .500 (.057) .547 (.074) .513 (.071) .489 (.065) .520 (.047) .451 (.040) .345 (.041)
Log firm size .020 (.002) .017 (.003) .016 (.006) .021 (.006) .023 (.005) .028 (.004) .041 (.004) .039 (.004)
Log number supervised .063 (.003) .068 (.007) .071 (.009) .070 (.010) .071 (.009) .058 (.007) .060 (.006) .055 (.007)
R  adjusted .269 .356 .220 .213 .244 .416 .363 .326
2TABLE 1 S REGRESSION OF LOG HOURLY WAGES ON PERSONAL, JOB AND SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS
Total sample 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
(N = 17,436) (N = 2,325) (N = 2,279) (N = 2,352) (N = 2,399) (N = 2,531) (N = 2,654) (N = 2,896)
-27-
C. Sector Characteristics Only
Intercept 2.762 (.012) 2.487 (.031) 2.519 (.041) 2.658 (.041) 2.738 (.040) 2.702 (.034) 2.757 (.030) 2.923 (.015)
Sector (reference: transport):
1 (agriculture) -.086 (.026) -.185 (.079) -.114 (.119) -.257 (.105) -.228 (.094) -.140 (.090) -.111 (.062) -.093 (.030)
2 (food, beverages etc.) -.136 (.028) -.155 (.065) .006 (.082) -.019 (.077) -.077 (.074) -.020 (.062) -.018 (.065) .000 (.000)
3 (other industry) -.194 (.020) -.121 (.047) -.062 (.061) -.142 (.059) -.101 (.059) -.066 (.050) -.062 (.047) -.138 (.053)
4 (chemicals) -.047 (.033) -.092 (.089) -.002 (.110) .056 (.089) .112 (.084) .045 (.070) .065 (.064) .010 (.005)
5 (metal products) -.120 (.019) -.081 (.042) .058 (.057) -.016 (.057) .052 (.056) -.008 (.048) -.012 (.043) -.089 (.079)
6 (energy) .039 (.030) .003 (.072) .224 (.085) .040 (.086) .111 (.079) .243 (.075) .294 (.070) -.079 (.068)
7 (construction) -.162 (.019) -.049 (.043) -.046 (.058) -.094 (.057) -.077 (.055) -.084 (.049) -.082 (.043) -.074 (.041)
8 (trade) -.236 (.016) -.198 (.038) -.070 (.053) -.141 (.051) -.163 (.048) -.130 (.041) -.143 (.037) -.281 (.028)
9 (other services) -.140 (.016) -.130 (.039) -.009 (.050) -.063 (.050) -.061 (.047) -.019 (.041) -.015 (.037) -.148 (.031)
10 (banks) -.002 (.022) -.017 (.050) .143 (.069) .115 (.069) .057 (.063) .094 (.060) .117 (.050) .043 (.046)
11 (non-profit services) -.133 (.015) -.129 (.037) -.022 (.049) -.099 (.049) -.065 (.047) -.060 (.039) -.008 (.035) -.101 (.024)
12 (government) .091 (.015) .109 (.036) .227 (.049) .166 (.050) .165 (.047) .239 (.040) .207 (.036) .173 (.030)
R  adjusted .144 .162 .132 .131 .135 .192 .166 .174
2
Notes: Estimates by OLS with dependent variable the logarithm of hourly wages of employees. Standard errors in Brackets. The coefficient for level of education reflects
the return to an additional year of education. In 1986 and 1988 the data contain only males.-28-
TABLE 2 S SKILLS, COMPLEXITIES AND UPGRADING
Total sample 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
(N = 17,436) (N = 2,325) (N = 2,279) (N = 2,352) (N = 2,399) (N = 2,531) (N = 2,654) (N = 2,896)
A. Correlation between Personal, Job and Sector Characteristics
Correlation explained Panel A and
B of Table 1 .410 .254 .323 .490 .495 .526 .526 .485
Correlation explained Panel A and
C of Table 1 .169 .104 .169 .150 .189 .255 .231 .231
Correlation explained Panel B and
C of Table 1 .264 .238 .273 .265 .301 .362 .340 .314
B. Personal, Job and Sector Characteristics 
Weighted with Coefficient for 1986
Mean value (1  moment):
st
Personal characteristics 2.373 2.244 2.351 2.343 2.364 2.371 2.373 2.408
Job characteristics 2.421 2.293 2.368 2.432 2.439 2.439 2.448 2.459
Sector characteristics 2.431 2.331 2.425 2.434 2.434 2.434 2.431 2.434
Standard deviation (2  moment):
nd
Personal characteristics .118 .182 .187 .200 .190 .182 .184 .176
Job characteristics .198 .180 .177 .204 .205 .202 .203 .208
Sector characteristics .085 .080 .080 .086 .088 .089 .091 .087TABLE 2 S SKILLS, COMPLEXITIES AND UPGRADING
Total sample 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
(N = 17,436) (N = 2,325) (N = 2,279) (N = 2,352) (N = 2,399) (N = 2,531) (N = 2,654) (N = 2,896)
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C. Job Characteristics (Deviation from 1986 Mean Value) Explained by Personal and by Sector
(Deviation from 1986 Mean Value) Characteristics
Intercept .058 (.001) -.000 (.001) .001 (.003) .088 (.004) .085 (.004) .076 (.004) .085 (.004) .081 (.003)
Personal Characteristics .374 (.006) .240 (.020) .270 (.014) .423 (.016) .432 (.017) .420 (.017) .402 (.017) .428 (.018)
Intercept .047 (.001) .000 (.002) .001 (.003) .053 (.004) .061 (.004) .059 (.004) .068 (.004) .074 (.004)
Sector Characteristics .589 (.014) .506 (.049) .627 (.032) .543 (.039) .548 (.038) .581 (.036) .563 (.035) .527 (.037)
Intercept .068 (.001) .000 (.004) .020 (.003) .093 (.004) .091 (.004) .082 (.004) .091 (.004) .085 (.003)
Personal Characteristics .333 (.006) .219 (.022) .238 (.013) .392 (.016) .395 (.017) .372 (.017) .356 (.017) .386 (.018)
Sector Characteristics .454 (.014) .456 (.048) .551 (.031) .382 (.036) .377 (.036) .412 (.034) .409 (.054) .355 (.036)
Notes: Initial estimates by OLS as in Table 1.